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PUBLIC EMPLOYEE PENSION RIGHTS AND THE 1970
ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION: DOES ARTICLE XIII,
SECTION 5 GUARANTEE INCREASED PROTECTION?
INTRODUCTION

The status of public employee pension rights' is of vital
2
concern to more than 616,000 members of Illinois pension funds.
Members rely on pension benefits for economic security in their
retirement and as personal security in the event of disability or
other unforeseen hardships. Pension benefits are also a major
factor affecting recruitment of government employees; thus, the
security of these benefits affects the calibre of public service
rendered to the individual citizen by such public employees.
The status of pension rights is not simply the isolated concern of public employees who rely on these benefits. Each
Illinois citizen is directly affected in his capacity as taxpayer
since pension benefits comprise an increasingly greater tax burden. As legislation adds liberalized pensions benefits, and as
additional government employees enter service, this tax burden
cannot help but increase further.
The revelation that public employee pension benefits have
historically been characterized by courts as "gratuitious" and
''non-contractual" carries broad implications for both pensioner
and taxpayer. The public employee has often been unaware of
this characterization and is understandably disturbed when he
learns of it. The taxpayer, on the other hand, may feel relief
that the tax burden created by pension benefits can be lessened
if circumstances require.
1. The scope of this comment is limited to public pensions, as opposed to private pensions, because the constitutional provision forming
the basis for this analysis is only concerned with public employee pensions. ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 5 (1970). "Pension" or "pension right,"
refers to annuities or credits earned toward such annuities under a joint
contributory plan, payable upon retirement from government service,
and normally related to age and service conditions.
Recent federal pension legislation is inapplicable to public employee
government pensions plans.

It specifically provides that "[t]he provi-

sions of this subchapter shall not apply to any employee benefit plan
if (1) such plan is a governmental plan."

29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (1)

2. The types of employees covered include:

(1974).

judges, state legislators,

state university employees, Chicago and downstate teachers, policemen,

firemen, and other local, county, and state employees. They belong to
the 455 individual pension funds operating under 17 sections of the Pension Code, chapter 108 , Illinois Revised Statutes. 1975 REPORT OF ExAMINATION, PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' PENSION FUNDS, ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF

INSURANCE, at 42 (1975)
TION).

(hereinafter cited as 1975 REPORT OF EXAMINA-
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The adoption of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, however, insured that public employee pension rights would no longer be
defeated so easily. The pension provision contained in article
XIII, section 5 provides:
Membership in any pension or retirement system of the
State, any unit of local government or school district, or any
agency thereof, shall be an enforceable contractual relationship,
the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired.3
This section developed from concern over the security of
pension funds in the light of financial and historical developments. Public employees feared that the grant of new powers
to home rule units might result in modification or termination
of benefits by financially hard pressed municipalities. 4 Members of state supported pension programs feared that the Illinois
General Assembly's longstanding reluctance to fund adequately
its share of pension contributions might impair the financial
viability of their funds and thus the prospect of receiving benefits when due. 5 Those public employees, aware that their benefits were characterized as "bounties" or "gratuities," were concerned that their benefits might be modified or terminated by
the legislature in the future.! These combined concerns were
sufficiently persuasive to cause the pension section to be included
in the 1970 Illinois Constitution.
Until the new pension section, no constitutional safeguard
existed in Illinois for the majority of pension funds. Article II,
section 14 of the 1870 Constitution protected against impairment
of contracts, but was inapplicable to most pension plans. 7 Basically, the courts have distinguished pension rights on the basis
of the type of participation in the plan. While optional participation plans were characterized as "contractual," the majority
are still mandatory participation plans, and the courts have
labelled these "gratuitous." These "non-contractual" mandatory
3. ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 5 (1970) (emphasis added).
4. See delegate Green's comments during introduction of article
XIII, section 5 on the floor of the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention.
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILL. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, Verbatim Transcripts,vol. IV at 2925 (1969-1970) (hereinafter cited as Verbatim Transcripts).

5. The five state supported pension funds in Illinois are: Judges Re-

tirement System, State Universities Retirement System, Teachers Re-

tirement System, State Employees Retirement System, and General
Assembly Retirement System. 1975 REPORT OF EXAMINATION at 26.
6. See comments of delegates Green, Kinney, Kemp, and Lyons.
Verbatim Transcripts, vol. IV at 2925-29. The "gratuity" concept basic-

ally holds that pension benefits under mandatory participation plans are
"bounties" or "gratuities," and thus may be changed, diminished, or abrogated entirely at the will of the legislature. Dodge v. Board of Educ.,
302 U.S. 74 (1937); Bergin v. Board of Trustees, 31 ll. 2d 566, 202 N.E.2d
489 (1964).

7. "No ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of con-

tracts, or making any irrevocable grant of special privileges or immunities, shall be passed." ILL. CONST. art. II, § 14 (1870).
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participation plans thus fell outside of the 1870 Constitution's
scope of protection. 8
The basic issue presented is the extent of protection which
article XIII, section 5 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution provides
for pension funds. The scope of the phrase "enforceable contractual relationship" determines whether or not this section provides a new status for mandatory participation funds. If a more
protected status is mandated by the constitution, analysis must
then center on the issue of the pension benefits which may not
be "diminished or impaired." Aspects of this issue include the
type of benefits protected, the question of vesting, and the extent
of funding which may be constitutionally required to insure that
pension benefits are protected. Some of these issues have been
specifically decided by the Illinois Supreme Court in cases which
will be discussed in subsequent sections of this comment. Due
to the narrow nature of these holdings, however, any analysis
of the pensions rights issue must depend largely on factors
which are raised only by inference in these recent decisions. An
historical view of pension rights is the initial step in attempting
to define the parameters of article XIII, section 5.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE-UNITED STATES PENSION LAW
Gratuity Theory
The landmark decision of Pennie v. Reis9 established the
legal nature of compulsory public employee pension funds.
Pennie involved deductions of $2 per month from police officers'
pay which was placed into the police life and health insurance
fund. The benefit in question was a $1,000 death benefit payment.
Ten days before an officer's death the legislature repealed the
death benefit by amendment. His widow claimed that the contributions taken from the officer's pay established a property interest in the death benefit which could not be impaired by the legislature because of the U.S. Constitutional prohibition against
impairment of contracts. 10 In rejecting this contention the Court
held that the fund was "subject to change or revocation at any
time, at the will of the legislature."" There was no absolute
8. Pecoy v. City of Chicago, 265 Ill. 78, 106 N.E. 435 (1914). In contrast, for a voluntary participation fund, rights are protected by the impairment of contracts clause. Bardens v. Board of Trustees, 22 Ill. 2d
56, 174 N.E.2d 168 (1961). It is important to note that a pension fund
may be contributory (most Illinois funds involve joint contributions by
employer and employee) or non-contributory (employer pays for the
pension). However, the crucial distinction is not contributions, but the
type of participation, whether mandatory or optional.
9. 132 U.S. 464 (1889).
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.

11. 132 U.S. at 471.
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property right possessed by the officer, and "[n] o vested right
in the officer to such payment." 12 Until the actual moment
when a payment became due, the officer's interest remained
"[a] mere expectancy, created by law, and liable to be revoked
or destroyed by the same authority."' 13
The gratuity theory of pension rights thus sprang from the
1889 holding in Pennie. This theory is as strong today as it was
then. In 1974 a federal district court asserted that Pennie is still
the leading case on pension rights and followed its holding even
14
though it recognized the harsh effect of the gratuity theory.
Federal case law makes no distinction among the various
categories of pension plans. Whether a plan is non-contributory
or contributory (whether mandatory or optional participation),
the federal courts have held that none provide vested rights in
pension benefits.1 5 The only significant concession to pension
rights is that the pensioner has a vested interest in a payment
6
once it becomes due.'
ContractualTheory
The first case establishing the contractual theory for pension
benefits was Ball v. Board of Trustees.17 The foundation for
the contractual theory is the distinction between mandatory and
optional participation in a pension plan. Unlike federal case law,
many states provide a greater protection for optional participation plans. In the Ball case, a New Jersey retirement plan calling for optional participation was construed to be a contractual
relationship. The court held that the statutory provision of pension benefits for teachers was analogous to traditional contract
principles, and thus the agreement "could not be altered without
the consent of both parties . . . and upon sufficient consideration."' 8
The mandatory-optional participation distinction is the key
to labelling pension benefit rights as either contractual or
12. Id.
13. Id.

14. Muzquiz v. City of San Antonio, 378 F. Supp. 949 (W.D. Tex.

1974): "The rule is harsh, perhaps, but we feel constrained in this case
to apply the law as it is given to us, stare decisis, for it has heretofore admitted of no exceptions and no modifications. . . " Id. at 958.
15. Dodge v. Board of Educ., 302 U.S. 74 (1939); Lynch v. United
States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934) (dictum); Rafferty v. United States, 210 F.2d
934 (3rd Cir. 1954); Anderson v. United States, 205 F.2d 326 (9th Cir.
1953); Morgan v. United States, 115 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1941); MacLeod
v. Fernandez, 101 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1938); In re Goodwin, 57 F.2d 31 (6th
Cir. 1932); Robbins v. Police Pension Fund, 321 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y.
1970); Price v. Folsom, 168 F. Supp. 392 (D.C.N.J. 1959); Allen v. United
States, 148 F. Supp. 817 (S.D. Ill. 1957); Gibney v. United States, 146
F. Supp. 135 (S.D. Cal. 1956).
16. Price v. Folsom, 168 F. Supp. 392, 398 (D.C.N.J. 1959).

17. 71 N.J.L. 64, 58 A. 111 (Sup. Ct. 1904).

18. Id. at 66, 58 A. at 112.
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gratuitous. Case law throughout the United States supports its
result through this distinction.19 Yet this method of determining pension rights is not without its critics. 20

While the labels

applied to pension plans may determine whether pension rights
receive protection from diminishment, the goals and objectives
of pension plans remain the same regardless of label. There is
no compelling practical justification for the optional-mandatory
distinction.
Cases supporting the gratuity theory often employ archaic
concepts and language. Few public employees would consider
their pensions to be in the "nature of a bounty springing from
the appreciation and graciousness of the sovereign. '' 21 Yet this
language is found in a 1957 judicial opinion. While it may be
desirable that a reasonable power of modification should be
retained by a legislature, archaic language is poor support for
such a result.
An inflexible application of the counterpart contractual
theory may also harm total pension objectives. If application
of the contract theory denies the legislature the ability to adjust
pension benefits or contributions in order to maintain the fiscal
viability of a pension fund, the very benefits which are being
so zealously guarded may be lost. 22

In view of the adverse

consequences which may attach from inflexible application of
either the gratuity or contract theory, several states have outlined a third alternative method of establishing pension rights.
Limited Vesting
California and Washington have extensively used a principle
described as "limited vesting. '23 The thrust of "limited vesting"
is to recognize a power of legislative modification within reasonable limits. While the weakness of the principle is an inability
to rely on any specified objective criteria to determine if a change
19. Hanson v. City of Idaho Falls, 92 Idaho 512, 446 P.2d 634 (1968);
Blough v. Ekstrom, 14 111. App. 2d 153, 144 N.E.2d 436 (1957); Bader v.
Crone, 116 N.J.L. 329, 184 A. 346 (Sup. Ct. 1936); State ex rel. Fox v.
Board of Trustees, 148 W. Va. 369, 135 S.E.2d 262 (Sup. Ct. of App.
1964).
20. See Cohn, Public Employee Retirement Plans-The Nature of the
Employees' Rights, 1968 ILL. L.F. 32.
21. Blough v. Ekstrom, 14 Ill. App. 2d 153, 160, 144 N.E.2d 436, 440
(1957).
22. Just such a situation led to the result in Spina v. Consol. Police
and Firemen's Pension Fund Comm'n, 41 N.J. 391, 197 A.2d 169 (1964),
where the court deviated from strict application of the contract theory
to avoid bankruptcy. See text accompanying notes 24 and 25 infra.
23. E.g., Houghton v. City of Long Beach, 164 Cal. App. 2d 298, 330
P.2d 918 (1958); Eisenbacher v. City of Tacoma, 53 Wash. 2d 280, 333
P.2d 642 (1958); Leterman v. City of Tacoma, 53 Wash. 2d 294, 333 P.2d
650 (1958); Pearson v. Los Angeles County, 49 Cal. 2d 523, 319 P.2d 624
(1957).
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in pension benefits is "reasonable," the courts have emphasized
the need for "corresponding" or "compensatory" benefits in keeping with principles of equity. Thus an emphasis on pension
labels is minimized in favor of a thorough consideration of the
effect of changes on pension objectives.
Another example of a judicial attempt to protect pension
rights without resorting to labels is a New Jersey case, Spina
v. Consolidated Police and Firemen's Pension Fund Commission.24 In construing the effect of a decrease in pension benefits
legislated on a mandatory participation plan, the court rejected
the simple alternative of labelling pension rights as "gratuitous."
Instead, the court dealt squarely with the situation, detailing
first the revisions of pension provisions necessitated by the fund's
financial instability. It then held that the validity of the legislation imposing more stringent age and service requirements and
increased employer and employee contributions should be measured in terms of alternatives rather than the specific impact upon
the individual plaintiffs. The court felt "[t] here is no profit in
dealing with labels such as 'gratuity,' 'compensation,' 'contract,'
and 'vested rights.' None fits precisely, and it would be a
mistake to choose one and be driven by that choice to some
' 25
inevitable consequence.
The three approaches to pension rights by jurisdictions other
than Illinois serve to illustrate necessary principles for understanding pension rights adequately. They also outline the possible approaches which Illinois might have utilized in determining the status of pension rights. Later analysis will compare
the effect of the Illinois constitution pension provision on pension
rights with the effect these three approaches had on pension
rights. The initial supposition is that the term "enforceable contractual relationship" brings Illinois pension rights after 1970
under the ambit of the "contractual" theory. The following exposition of Illinois case law will establish the context of pension
rights prior to the adoption of the pension provision in the new
constitution.
ILLINOIS PENSION LAW BEFORE THE 1970 ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION

The majority of Illinois decisions have adhered to the
traditional classification of pension rights as "gratuitious" in
mandatory participation plans and "contractual" in optional
participation plans. 26 At one time it appeared that Illinois might
24. 41 N.J. 391, 197 A.2d 169 (1964).
25. Id. at 401, 197 A.2d at 174.

26. Bergin v. Board of Trustees, 31 Ill. 2d 566, 202 N.E.2d 489 (1964);

Jordan v. Metropolitan Sanitary District, 15 Ill. 2d 369, 155 N.E.2d 297
(1958); Keegan v. Board of Trustees, 412 Ill. 430, 107 N.E.2d 702 (1952);

446 The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 9:440

attach contractual status to all pension plans. In a 1914 case,
Hughes v. Traeger,27 a pension plan was challenged on the ground
that it provided "extra compensation" in violation of article IV,
section 9 of the 1870 Illinois Constitution. The court dismissed this
contention, declaring that pensions are "[p] ay withheld to induce
long-continued and faithful service ... .
Almost simultaneously, however, the gratuity concept of
pension rights was developing. In the 1914 case of Pecoy v. City
of Chicago29 a legislative modification increasing the minimum
service requirement from 10 to 20 years was held not to violate
plaintiffs' constitutional right against impairment of contracts.
The court held that since the pensions were not contractual relationships, but in the nature of bounties which could be modified
or terminated at the legislature's discretion, these pension benefits did not fall under the constitutional guarantee. Subsequent
decisions have strengthened and expanded the gratuity concept. 30
The contradictory principles of pensions as both "earned but
deferred compensation," and as "gratuities" have existed simultaneously in Illinois case law with no attempt by the courts to
reconcile the apparent conflict. On occasion these conflicting
principles have even been applied to the same funds. 31 The contradiction is difficult to justify, since "earned but deferred comWagner v. Retirement Board, 370 Ill. 73, 17 N.E.2d 972 (1938); Porter v.
Loehr, 332 Ill. 353, 163 N.E. 689 (1928); People ex rel. Drea v. Hanson,
330 Ill. 79, 161 N.E. 145 (1928); McCann v. Retirement Board, 331 Ill.
193, 162 N.E. 859 (1928); People ex rel. Donovan v. Retirement Board,
326 Ill. 579, 158 N.E. 220 (1927); Stiles v. Board of Trustees, 281 Ill. 636,
118 N.E. 202 (1917); Londrigan v. Board of Trustees, 7 Ill. App. 3d 572,
288 N.E.2d 125 (1972) (the deciding event occurred before the effective
date of the 1970 Ill. Const.); Jansen v. Illinois Municipal Retirement
Fund, 58 Ill. App. 2d 97, 206 N.E.2d 249 (1965); Dannenberg v. Frantz,
41 Ill. App. 2d 150, 190 N.E.2d 132 (1963); Blough v. Ekstrom, 14 Ill. App.
2d 153, 144 N.E.2d 436 (1957).
27. 264 Ill. 612, 106 N.E. 431 (1914).
28. Id. at 618, 106 N.E. at 433. This earned but deferred compensation theory was strengthened by subsequent cases: McFarlane v. Hotz,
401 Ill. 506, 82 N.E.2d 650 (1948); Sommers v. Patton, 399 Ill. 540, 78 N.E.
2d 313 (1948).
29. 265 111. 78, 106 N.E. 435 (1914).
30. See note 26 supra. A case illustrating the length to which the
courts have been willing to stretch the gratuity concept under the mandatory-optional distinction is Keegan v. Board of Trustees, 412 Ill. 430,
107 N.E.2d 702 (1952). The affected plan was mandatory, but the legislature had declared the annuities and benefits to be vested rights. The
court managed to hold that a vested right is not a contractual interest
where participation is mandatory, despite the vested language in the law,
holding that "[a]vested right is created in the participant to share in
the fund in the manner and on such terms as the legislature may, from
time to time, determine best serves the welfare of the participants and
the people of the State." Id. at 435-36, 107 N.E.2d at 706. Thus a vested
right in a compulsory plan was really nothing more than a gratuity, and
distinctly inferior to a contractual right.
31. People ex rel. Schmidt v. Yerger, 21 Ill. 2d 338, 172 N.E.2d 753

(1961); Sommers v. Patton, 399 Ill. 540, 78 N.E.2d 313 (1948).
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pensation" seems to imply a contractual relationship and the
label of contractual and gratuitious certainly cannot coexist
when applied to the same fund. It is apparent, however, that
this contradiction arose from the nature of the challenge against
the legislative action. To justify the power of the legislature
to establish pension plans, courts avoided attacks which claimed
that the plans were "extra compensation" by answering that pensions were not gifts, but salary earned and deferred until completion of service. 32 Conversely, when the legislature diminished
pension benefits, the courts withstood the challenge that these
rights were "contractual" or "vested" (and thus under the protection of the impairment of contracts clause in the 1870 Constitution) by labelling the pension benefits as "gratuities" or
"expectancies. 3 3 No apparent attempt has been made to reconcile these conflicting principles, presumably because each serves
a useful purpose and because reconciliation might indeed be more
confusing than the existing situation. The existence of this contradiction does serve to illustrate the fragile rationale underlying
pension labels.
While Illinois attached the gratuity theory to mandatory
participation pension plans, it also adhered to the technique of
labelling optional participation plans as "contractual." Raines
v. Board of Education34 upheld an increase of post-retirement
benefits to teachers under an optional membership plan. Previous post-retirement increases under mandatory participation
plans had been held to violate the "extra compensation" prohibition in the constitution.3 5 The court saved the post-retirement
increases in Raines by distinguishing the previous cases on the
theory that Raines involved an optional rather than mandatory
participation plan. Since the optional nature established a contractual status, the benefits were not constitutionally prohibited
gifts. Subsequent decisions have affirmed this distinction by
granting contractual status to plans which fit into the optional
36
participation pattern set by Raines.
There are only a few recent cases which do not fit neatly
into the Illinois mandatory-optional classification. Voight v.
Board of Education37 involved a post-retirement increase similar
to Raines. But the Voight plan, unlike Raines, had been labelled
32. See notes 27 and 28 supra.

33. See notes 29 and 30 supra.
34. 365 Ill. 610, 7 N.E.2d 489 (1937).

35. Porter v. Loehr, 332 Ill. 353, 163 N.E. 689 (1928).
36. Bardens v. Board of Trustees, 22 Ill. 2d 56, 174 N.E.2d 168 (1961);
People ex rel. Judges Retirement System v. Wright, 379 Ill. 328, 40 N.E.2d
719 (1942); Ridgely v. Board of Trustees, 371 Ill. 409, 21 N.E.2d 286
(1939).
37. 413 Ill. 233, 108 N.E.2d 426 (1952).
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gratuitous. Previous case authority held that post-retirement
increases under mandatory (thus "gratuitious") plans were constitutionally prohibited. 38 Since the Voight plan could not be
labelled "contractual," the court surmounted the dilemma by
applying the concept of "moral obligation" to pension rights.
The "moral obligation" to provide the post-retirement increases
overrode the constitutional prohibition against gifts.
Another case involving a similar situation but a different
solution is Gorham v. Board of Trustees of the Teachers'
Retirement System. 39 Here, a contractual status was superimposed over a plan of mandatory participation by virtue of
voluntary (thus optional) payments made by retired school
teachers which enabled them to receive much larger supplemental payments yearly. It appears that the voluntary payment
of the nominal sum effectively changed the legal status of the
pension plan, allowing the advantages of contractual status.
Raines, Voight, and Gorham raise the question of whether
the distinction between gratuitious and contractual pension plans
has been obliterated. By utilizing various rationale, these cases
have afforded mandatory participation plans the contractual
status normally extended only to optional participation plans. If
the trend in Illinois pension law is to afford contractual status
to mandatory funds under various rationale, the term "enforceable contractual relationship" in the new constitution merely
confirms what has already taken place. Such a conclusion, however, is subject to question. Each of these three cases involved
challenges to the validity of post-retirement pension increases.
The courts have already proven adept at fashioning the "earned
but deferred" rationale to justify the existence of pension
plans. This similar method is now being used to sustain desired
post-retirement pension increases against the same challenges
that the payments are constitutionally prohibited gifts. But
when the validity of modification or termination of pension
benefits has been challenged, the Illinois Courts have never
failed to adhere to the traditional mandatory-optional distinction.
Decisions rendered up to the effective date of the new pension
provision in the 1970 Illinois Constitution contain language and
reasoning clearly indicating an adherence to the optional-mandatory distinction.40 By contrast, neither Voight nor Gorham has
been used subsequently to support a contractual status for any

38. Wagner v. Retirement Board, 370 Ill. 73, 17 N.E.2d 972 (1938);
Porter v. Loehr, 332 Ill. 353, 163 N.E. 689 (1928).
39. 27 Ill. 2d 593, 190 N.E.2d 329 (1963).

40. Londrigan v. Board of Trustees, 7 Ill. App. 3d 572, 288 N.E.2d 125
(1972) (the deciding event had occurred before the effective date of the
new pension provision); Jansen v. Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund,
58 Ill. App. 2d 97, 206 N.E.2d 249 (1965).
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mandatory participation plan. It is clear that the new pension
provision is not surplusage on existing case law. Its proponents
correctly believed that their pension rights under mandatory participation plans were still "gratuitous," and in need of greater
protection.
CONTEMPORARY HISTORY-THE

ADOPTION OF THE PENSION

SECTION INTO THE 1970 ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION

Article XIII, section 5 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution lacks
many of the attributes which ordinarily facilitate constitutional
interpretation. The pension section is not a model of deliberation, and interpretation is made more difficult by that fact. The

pension provision was neither the subject of any formal hearing,
nor was it the consensual judgment of any committee of the Constitutional Convention. It was offered at a plenary session and

adopted with relatively little debate.4 1 Neither the Illinois
Public Employees Pension Laws Commission, 42 nor any state
or local officials or private organizations concerned with the
operation of public retirement plans, such as the Civic Federation
of Chicago or the Illinois Taxpayers Federation, had any advance notice of the intended convention action. 43 At the very
least, notice to these vitally concerned groups would have given
them the opportunity to prepare background information which
would have allowed the convention to make a more informed
judgment on the pension section's merits. The additional fact
that no committee hearings were held on the section makes interpretation of constitutional intent extremely difficult.
Prior to actual sponsorship of the section, concerned firemen
and policemen had contacted many delegates, expressing their
fear that greater home rule powers would increase the likelihood
of modification or termination of their pensions by municipalities. They contacted members of the Bill of Rights Committee
and suggested that a pension provision be included in the Bill
of Rights section. 44 Meanwhile, several delegates sponsored the
41.

REPORT Or THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COM-

(hereinafter cited as 1971 PENSION REPORT).
42. The Pension Laws Commission produces the PENSION REPORT previously cited. The Commission is authorized by ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 108
§ 22-802 to inquire into all aspects of the pension problems affecting public employees in Illinois and to promote and maintain benefits which are
adequately financed and in accord with fundamental pension principles.
Its functions include an appraisal of the pension laws in force and a critical analysis and evaluation of proposals for amendment of pension laws
with respect to their policy and cost implications.
43. 1971 PENSION REPORT at 65.
44. In a recent law review article, Professor Elmer Gertz of The John
Marshall Law School related his experiences on the Bill of Rights Committee of the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention. He noted that the
committee received hundreds of letters asking it to consider inclusion of
MISSION at 65 (1971)

the pension provision in the Bill of Rights section. Committee members
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section as an amendment to the legislative article of the constitu45
tion.
The debate on the section was exceedingly confused, with
the several sponsors questioning each other as to the true intent
of the section. 46 While delegate Green expressed the conviction
that the section mandated the General Assembly to fully-fund
the state-supported funds, drawing support from a similar
pension provision in the New York Constitution which apparently achieved that result, 47 delegates Lyons, Kinney and
Whalen each asserted that the section had nothing to do with
48
mandating any level of funding at all.
A number of mistaken assertions were made by both advocates and opponents of the section. 49 Yet there was at least
were unsure whether the pension provision properly belonged in the Bill
of Rights, but their concern was mooted when delegate Kinney sponsored
a proposal to include the pension provision in the legislative article.
Gertz, The Making of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, 5 J. Mar. J. 215,
232-33 (1972).
45. 'The pension amendment to the legislative article passed. The
vote was: 57 yea, 36 nay, 3 present, and 6 pass. Verbatim Transcripts,
vol. IV at 2933. Subsequently the pension provision was deleted from
the legislative article and placed in article XIII.
46. Delegate Lyons:
But I would like to ask one of the sponsors of the amendmentI am a co-sponsor of it myself-I thought that the purpose of this
amendment was to give protection to those people who felt that they
needed protection for their pension rights in the event that sweeping
home rule powers were given to local governments....
that.I would just appreciate an answer from somebody who feels
that he knows.
Verbatim Transcripts,vol. IV at 2928.
47. It was delegate Green's assertion that the pension section would
mandate full-funding which surprised co-sponsors and touched off a
round of questioning. The New York amendment provides:
After July first, nineteen hundred forty, membership in any
pension or retirement system of the state or of a civil division thereof
shall be a contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not
be diminished or impaired.
McKINNEY'S CoNsT. art. 5, § 7.

48. Verbatim Transcripts,vol. IV at 2928-30.
49. These assertions include: "The New York Constitution mandated
that state to fully fund the program in two years." Verbatim Transcripts, vol. IV at 2925. There is no basis for this statement. The New
York courts have never construed their constitutional provision as mandating full-funding.
"Now, what about diminished? . . . Suppose we have more infla-

tion.... Haven't we then diminished the pension funding and the pension rights of a pensioner, based upon today's dollars?" Verbatim Transcripts, vol. IV at 2927. Based upon ordinary contract principles, such
a suggestion is ridiculous. When 'a person contracts to perform work for
"X" number of dollars, he receives that amount, no more, no less, unless
some provision for inflation has been included in the contract.
"This would, it seems to me, prohibit consolidation [of various local
pension plans into a statewide plan]." Verbatim Transcripts, vol. IV at
2927. This assertion was answered by delegate Kinney. "It is also not
intended to get into freezing in a system of trustees or persons who
would administer the various funds." Verbatim Transcripts, vol. IV at
2929.
"It seems to me that the [impairment of contracts clause in the 1870
Illinois Constitution] gives the pensioner the protection against the diminishing or impairing of his contractual rights, which the proponents of
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some degree of certainty established as to the basic intent of the
section. It was generally agreed that the intent was "that people
who do accept employment will not find at a future time that
they are not entitled to the benefits they thought they were when
they accepted employment." 50
It was also agreed that an
increase in benefits was not precluded. 51 In accordance with
basic contract principles, the delegates noted that the scope of
protection afforded by the "enforceable contractual relationship"
would depend on the content of the contract comprising the
2
relationship.
The convention debates provide little guidance on perhaps
the most important issue relating to the protection of pension
benefits. The power of the legislature to modify pension provisions is limited by the "vesting" of rights concept. If the rights
vest at the moment of employment, the legislature may be
severely or absolutely limited in attempting to adjust pension
benefits. On the issue of the time of vesting, delegate Kinney
stated that "[a]ll we are seeking to do is to guarantee that
people will have the rights that were in force at the time they
entered into the agreement to become an employee. . .. "51
Taken literally, the section "vests" rights at the moment of employment and the legislature's power is thereby limited. For this
reason the Pension Laws Commission opposed the pension section, fearing that freezing a specific set of pension benefits would
have a stagnating effect on pension legislation. 4 The Pension
Laws Commission attempted to have language allowing a reasonable power of legislative modification added to the section or read
into the convention debates to establish intent, but no action was
taken during the convention. 55 Since the extent of legislative
modification power is a crucial element in pension rights, failure
of the convention to provide more specific guidance by debate
this amendment seek to achieve."

Verbatim Transcripts,vol. IV at 2930.

This assertion overlooks the fact that almost all Illinois pension plans

involve mandatory participation, have been construed as "gratuitous,"

and thus have been deemed outside the scope of protection afforded by
the impairment of contracts clause. See text accompanying notes 29 and
30 supra.
50. Verbatim Transcripts,vol. IV at 2931.

51. It is definitely the intent that an increase in benefits would not
be precluded. Many states tie their pension and retirement benefits
into a cost of living and raise them from time to time. It is the intent of this amendment to permit so doing if the legislature at some
future time should decide to do this.

Verbatim Transcripts,vol. IV at 2926.

52. Delegate Whalen noted that, "all [the pension provision] does is
say that the pension is a contractual interest which the pensioner has;
and the line of cases again has repeatedly held that this is a contractual
right and may be subject to any contingency built into the contract."
Verbatim Transcripts,vol. IV at 2930.
53. Verbatim Transcripts,vol. IV at 2931.
54. 1971 PENSioN REPORT at 65-66.

55. Id.
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or specific language is a major weakness of the section. Legislative modification is the primary method by which attempts to
diminish or impair pension benefits occur. This issue was left
unresolved by the convention and the Illinois courts have not
yet had occasion to determine the extent of such legislative
power to modify.
There are only two recent cases directly construing the
pension section. Analysis of them will indicate the extent to
which the courts have relied on the convention debates as a guide
to intent. Both holdings are rather narrow, insofar as each
establishes what the section does not provide, rather than what
increased protection it gives.
HINTS ON THE SCOPE OF PROTECTION PROVIDED BY THE PENSION
SECTION-PETERS V. CITY OF SPRINGFIELD

The first case decided by the Illinois Supreme Court which
construed article XIII, section 5 was Peters v. City of Springfield.56 The court held that reduction in the mandatory
retirement age for firemen from 63 to 60 years old was not a
diminishment or impairment under the protection of the constitution. Although this was the first case dealing with the constitutional section on pensions, the court provided little guidance
on the scope of the pension section. It did not point out the
difference betwe en the former gratuitous status of mandatory
participation plans and the new constitutional protection provided by the "enforceable contractual relationship."5 7 In a
rather narrow statement outlining what the pension section does
not protect, the court concluded that:
. ..the purpose and intent of the constitutional provision was
to insure that pension rights of public employees which had

been earned should not be 'diminished or impaired' but that it

was not intended, and did not serve, to prevent the defendant
City from reducing the maximum retirement age, even though
the reduction might affect pensions which plaintiffs would ultimately have received.58
The right to a 63 year old retirement age stemmed from the
Illinois Municipal Code which the court held the city, as a homerule unit, was not bound to follow.59 The Pension Code did
56. 57 Ill. 2d 142, 311 N.E.2d 107 (1974).
57. See notes 65 and 70 infra, and accompanying text for an illustration of the approach in New York and Michigan (both of which have
similar constitutional provisions) where the courts take great pains to
illuminate the differences raised by the new pension sections.
58. Peters v. City of Springfield, 57 Ill. 2d 142, 152, 311 N.E.2d 107,
112 (1974).

59. The court held that under the home rule powers conferred by ar-

ticle VII, section 6(a) of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, the City of Springfield could lower the retirement age to 60 since the General Assembly
had neither limited specifically the concurrent exercise of this power, nor
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not contain any section protecting the right to a maximum retirement at age 63.60 Although the court did not explicitly mention
the point, it evidently agreed with defendant's contention that
the only contractual rights protected are those based upon the
provisions of the Pension Code.
It appears that Peters, under the new pension provision,
provides less protection for pension benefits than previous cases
provided under the pre-1970 Constitution "contractual" theory
based on the mandatory-optional participation distinction. The
case of Bardens v. Board of Trustees of the Judges Retirement
System "1 is a pre-1970 case illustrating the strong protection Illinois courts have afforded contractual status pension plans. In
Bardens the court invalidated an attempted change in the computation of judges' retirement annuities on the basis that the
voluntary nature of the Judges Retirement System created
vested contractual rights in pension benefits. The court held
that the judge was entitled to computation of the retirement
annuity on the basis of the statutory plan existing at the time
of his initial entry into government service. If Bardens protects
computation of retirement benefits from impairment of contract
(under the 1870 Illinois Constitution) why does Peters fail
to protect the right of a 63 year maximum retirement age
under the contractual provisions of the new pension section?
The distinction must be made on the basis of the origin of the
right. In Bardens the right to computation of the annuity was
controlled by a formula contained in the Pension Code, 62 while
specifically declared the State's exercise of this power to be exclusive.
The 63 year retirement age was provided for by ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24,

§ 10-1-18 (1973).
60. The only provisions in the Pension Code setting up minimum age

requirements establish that in order to qualify for a pension a fireman
must be over 50 and have at least 20 years of service. ILL. RFv. STAT.
ch. 108 , § 4-109 (1973). By comparison, another section of the Pension
Code dealing with a different pension plan notes that no compulsory retirement age is set up by the pension law and no specific right is granted
to the employee to remain in service. Id., § 7-218.
61. 22 Ill. 2d 56, 174 N.E.2d 168 (1961).

62. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, § 5.1 (1949). The conclusion that the crucial distinction is whether the right is contained in the pension statute

is reinforced by analysis of two New York cases cited in Peters: Geary
v. Phillips, 53 Misc. 2d 337, 278 N.Y.S.2d 506 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (reduction
in retirement age did not violate the constitutional provision); contra,
Pettit v. McCabe, 60 Misc. 2d 177, 302 N.Y.S.2d 209 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (local

law reducing retirement age violated constitution).

Resolution of these

conflicting decisions was made by the Pettit court which noted that in
Geary the local pension plans involved were not in the New York State
Retirement System. The Pettit fund was a member of the New York

State Retirement System which specifically provided for a mandatory retirement age of 70. Thus in Pettit the court held that the local law,

which attempted to establish a mandatory retirement at 62, conflicted
with the provisions in the pension plan's statute and thus was invalid.

The conflict was not allowed because the State had pre-empted this particular area and local law could not be allowed to conflict. Under this
reasoning the result in Peters comports with the distinction set up.
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in Peters the right to the maximum retirement age was not contained in the Pension Code but rather in the Municipal Code.
Without this distinction, the new constitutional provision would
indeed appear to provide less protection than previous case law
did for pension benefits under optional participation pension
plans.
It is small comfort to the pensioner that the new pension
section provides no less protection than previously afforded. The
more crucial issue is whether it provides more protection for
pension benefits. Does Peters erase the distinction between
mandatory and optional participation pension plans, thus affording constitutional protection against impairment for all public
employee pension benefits? Dicta in a recent case supports this
assumption113 While it is reasonable to assume that Peters places
all pensions under the protection of the "contractual" theory, the
court does not mention the point or discuss the issue.
The Peters court cites several New York cases, indicating its
awareness of New York's similar constitutional provision. In
view of the fact that convention delegates also noted their awareness of the New York provision, the Illinois Supreme Court's
utilization of it as persuasive authority is an accepted and helpful method of constitutional analysis.6 4 New York cases construing their constitutional amendment shortly after its enactment left no doubt that its effect was to place all pension plans
within the contractual class of protection.6 5

While the cases

establishing this rule were not cited by the Peters court, it is
unlikely that Illinois would disagree with the basic purpose of
the constitutional provision as explained by the New York courts
and echoed by delegates at the Illinois Constitutional Convention.
Since Peters has demonstrated that persuasive cases from
other jurisdictions may be helpful in construing the pension section, it is helpful to note that several states have similar provisions in their constitutions. New York, 66 Alaska,6 7 Hawaii, 8
63. The new Illinois Constitution of 1970, S.H.A., effective July 1,
1971, appears to have no effect on the interpretation or validity of the
statutes here involved, except as it may have eliminated indirectly
the old case law distinction between voluntary and compulsory pension systems.
Illinois State Employees' Ass'n v. McC'arter, 9 Ill. App. 3d 764, 769, 292
N.E.2d 901, 904 (1973) (dicta).
64. "Where a constitutional provision has been borrowed from another state after it has been construed by the court of last resort of that
state, the general rule is that the construction is adopted with the provision." 16 AM. JuR. 2D ConstitutionalLaw § 82 (1973).
65. Birnbaum v. New York State Teachers Retirement System, 5 N.Y.
2d 1, 176 N.Y.S.2d 984, 152 N.E.2d 241 (1958); Day v. Mruk, 307 N.Y. 349,
121 N.E.2d 362 (1954).
66. See note 47 supra, for the text of the New York amendment.
67. "Membership in employee retirement systems of the State or its
political subdivisions shall constitute a contractual relationship. Accrued
enefits of these systems shall not be diminished or impaired." ALAsKA
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and Michigan 69 have constitutional provisions similar to article
XIII, section 5. Unfortunately, the Alaska and Hawaii sections
are so new that no case law construing their intent is now available. However, both Michigan and New York interpretive case
law provides a useful tool for analysis of the probable scope of
protection of the Illinois pension section.
The New York and Michigan cases make it clear that the
intent of the pension section should be to eliminate the distinction between mandatory and optional participation, thus provid70
ing contractual protection for both types of pension plans.
With this point accepted, the issue turns to the type of benefits
protected. It should be noted at the outset that any benefits
may be altered, modified, or released by contract, in accordance
with usual contract principles. 7 1 The Michigan and New York
courts have held that the right to a specific salary, even though
it was the basis for computation, was not protected. 7 2 In New
York the right to a specific mandatory retirement age is not a
protected benefit. 73 The loss of pension rights because of noncompliance with provisions of the pension statute is not protected
in New York,74 and neither is the right to remain in employment. 75 Finally, the loss of pension benefits accompanying
CONST. art. XII, § 7 (1959). The only case citing this section, Begich
v. Jefferson, 441 P.2d 27, -at 33 n.14 (Alaska 1968), does not deal with
the pension protection issue, thus there is no interpretive precedent available at this time for the Alaska provision.
68. "Membership in any employees' retirement system of the State
or any political subdivision thereof shall be a contractual relationship,
the accrued benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired." HAwAr CONST. art. XIV, § 2 (1959). No case precedent available.
69. The accrued financial benefits of each pension plan and retirement system of the state and its political subdivisions shall be -a
contractual obligation thereof which shall not be diminished or impaired thereby ...
Financial benefits arising on account of service rendered in each
fiscal year shall be funded during that year and such funding shall
not be used for financing unfunded accrued liabilities.
MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 24 (1963). Note that unlike Illinois, Michigan
includes a specific provision concerning funding. Also, unlike Alaska
and Hawaii, there is some Michigan precedent interpreting its constitutional pension provision. These cases will be referred to in subsequent
notes and text.
70. Birnbaum v. New York State Teachers Retirement System, 5
N.Y.2d 1, 176 N.Y.S.2d 984, 152 N.E.2d 241 (1958); Day v. Mruk, 307 N.Y.
349, 121 N.E.2d 362 (1954); Retired Policemen and Firemen of City of
Lincoln Park v. City of Lincoln Park, 6 Mich. App. 372, 149 N.W.2d 206
(1967); Campbell v. Michigan Judges Retirement Board, 378 Mich. 169,
143 N.W.2d 755 (1966).
71. Rosen v. New York City Teachers' Retirement Board, 202 Misc.

159, 115 N.Y.S.2d 263 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (reversed on waiver, 122 N.Y.S.2d

485 (1953)).
72. Hoar v. City of Yonkers, 295 N.Y. 274, 67 N.E.2d 157 (1946).
73. Geary v. Phillips, 53 Misc. 2d 337, 278 N.Y.S.2d 506 (Sup. Ct.
1967); contra, Pettit v. McCabe, 60 Misc. 2d 177, 302 N.Y.S.2d 209 (Sup.
Ct. 1969).
74. Holz v. Kowal, 27 A.D.2d 128, 276 N.Y.S.2d 398 (Sup. Ct. App.
Div. 1967). In Illinois there are numerous manners in which pension
benefits might be lost by failure to comply with the pension statute. One
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76
dismissal for cause from a police force was not protected.

It is interesting to note that most cases state what benefits
are not protected. There are several cases that do delineate the
benefits which are protected. The right to computation of benefits under the mortality tables existing upon initial employment
was a protected benefit in New York.7 7 The most important benefit which cases uphold as constitutionally protected is the right
to the provisions of the applicable pension statute as it existed
when the pension rights "vested. 7
The subclasses of benefits
protected is as broad as the applicable pension statute. The cases
noted reinforce the assumption that those provisions specifically
detailed in the applicable pension statute will be constitutionally
protected. Benefits which are related indirectly to the statute's
provisions, such as salary or retirement age, will not be protected.
The next issue is to determine the time at which the pension
benefits or rights "vest." If the rights vest at the time of initial
employment, the employee is entitled to their continuance as
they affect him at retirement. However, if the rights do not
vest until retirement, his rights may change during his employment, right up to retirement. Obviously, the rights must vest
earlier than the actual time of payment, or the constitutional
protection would be meaningless. The time of vesting has an
enormous impact on pension planning and policy. A determination that rights vest at initial employment should cause a much
more conservative outlook for policy makers and legislators
responsible for enactment of pension law.
such method which received recent publicity involved the loss of pension
rights resulting from conviction of a pension member for a felony connected with his office or duties. (See e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1081/2, §,2156). The Illinois General Assembly passed a bill which would have allowed legislators, judges and state employees convicted of a felony to
retain their benefits. This was attempted by deletion of the felony conviction section in each affected portion of the Pension Code. If the bill
had passed, some public employees would still retain their rights if convicted of a felony arising out of their official duties, and others would
not retain their benefits. Dubbing the measure the "Future Felons Protection Act," Governor Walker vetoed it. The State Journal-Register
(Springfield), Sept. 10, 1974 at 2.
75. Gorman v. City of New York, 304 N.Y. 865, 109 N.E.2d 881
(1952).
76. Robbins v. Police Pension Fund, 321 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(Plaintiff suspended and dismissed on 13 charges including assault, bigamy and forgery. Court held it is implicit that to receive benefits the
employee must complete service in good standing).
77. Ayman v. Teachers' Retirement Board, 9 N.Y.2d 119, 172 N.E.2d
571 (1961); Birnbaum v. New York State Teachers Retirement System
5 N.Y.2d 1, 176 N.Y.S.2d 984, 152 N.E.2d 241 (1958); cf. Haupt v. Teachers
Retirement Board, 28 Misc. 2d 686, 210 N.Y.S.2d 337 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
78. Kleinfeldt v. New York City Employees' Retirement System, 36
N.Y.2d 95, 324 N.E.2d 865 (1975); Donner v. New York City Employees'
Retirement System, 33 N.Y.2d 413, 308 N.E.2d 896 (1974); Detroit Police
Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 41 Mich. App. 723, 200 N.W.2d 722
(1972); Murphy v. Wayne County Employees Retirement Board of
Trustees, 35 Mich. App. 480, 192 N.W.2d 568 (1971).
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The Peters case does not deal directly with the issue of vesting, but it does contain language indicating that Illinois may be
tending toward vesting at retirement rather than at initial
employment. The court holds that "pension rights of public
employees which had been earned should not be 'diminished or
impaired.' ' 9 Thus it appears the court is establishing a
requirement that pension rights be earned by a period of employment before they are protected. While this language supports
such an assumption, the conclusion that rights do not vest until
retirement would be at variance with a considerable amount of
authority.
The debate at the constitutional convention indicated an
intent that such rights vest at the time of initial employment. s0
New York has made it explicitly clear that the purpose of their
constitutional provision was to change the old rule which provided that rights did not vest until retirement.8 ' Under the
new rule rights vest at the time of initial employment. It must
be noted that Michigan holds that rights do not vest until retirement, but this difference may be traced solely to the wording
of their pension provision. The Michigan section protects "the
accrued financial benefits. '8 2 The key word "accrued" determines that service must be completed before pension rights vest.
The Illinois pension provision does not contain the limitation of
"accrued," and it is difficult to see how it could be implied to
achieve the Michigan interpretation.
If a strict interpretation of the Illinois pension section eliminates the possibility of modification of pension benefits which
have vested at the time of initial employment, the severity of
the problem becomes readily apparent. The contractual status
afforded by the constitution may have locked in benefits which
the legislature or municipality felt were gratuitious when established. Now the benefits are contractual, and may not be
diminished as previously expected. In New York this situation
was anticipated in order to allow pension units to adjust their
obligations before the effective date of the constitutional amend8s3
ment giving the more protected status to pension benefits.
79. 57 II. 2d 142, 152, 311 N.E.2d 107, 112 (1974) (emphasis added).
80. See text -accompanying notes 50 and 53 supra.

81. Birnbaum v. New York State Teachers Retirement System, 5 N.Y.

2d 1, 152 N.E.2d 241, 176 N.Y.S.2d 984 (1958); Day v. Mruk, 307 N.Y. 349,
121 N.E.2d 362 (1954).
82. MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 24 (1963).

83. In Day v. Mruk, 307 N.Y. 349, 121 N.E.2d 362 (1954), the court

emphasized that the 1

year delay between the enactment of the pension

amendment and its effective date was in order to give pension systems

a chance to revise their provisions in light of the fact that benefits could
no longer be diminished or impaired as before. When the plaintiffs in
Birnbaum v. New York State Teachers Retirement System, 5 N.Y.2d 1,
152 N.E.2d 241, 176 N.Y.S.2d 984 (1958) claimed that the inability to
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Whether any Illinois pension units took protective measures in
anticipation of the new pension provision is an open question.
On the contrary, it appears that the Illinois General Assembly
is passing more liberal pension legislation aimed at expanding

pension benefits.8 4
A strict construction of the pension section as providing
vested rights at initial employment appears warranted by authority, but the practical implications of such a construction
could prove detrimental to pensions and pensioners. The adverse
effects of such a construction are tempered somewhat by holdings which state that attempted changes in pension benefits
would only be invalid as to persons in service at the time of
the attempted change. The change would be valid as to em15
If
ployees entering service subsequent to their effective date.
the state were severely hard-pressed in meeting the financial obligations of a pension program, some support for a reasonable impairment of contract may be gained from cases concerning the
0
impairment of contracts clause in the 1870 Illinois Constitution.
It must be noted, however, that although some impairments have
been justified by the courts and upheld by the U.S. Supreme
Court, the Illinois courts have never previously allowed any type
of impairment for a pension plan deemed "contractual" under
change mortality tables might throw the system into bankruptcy, the
court said they had delayed too long to attempt to change the tables now;
that if they were in trouble they should go to the legislature for funds.
84. The 1973 PENSION REPORT details the volume of proposed liberalized pension laws which it is called upon to consider and advise the Illinois General Assembly. There is no noticeable trend toward conservatism in pension benefit legislation since the pension provision was included in the 1970 Illinois Constitution.
85. In New York, since the employee's rights vest upon employment,
he takes subject to changes already in effect. The constitutional pension
provision does not serve to make the pensioner's rights retroactive to
those existing before his employment. Ayman v. Teachers' Retirement
Board of the City of New York, 9 N.Y.2d 119, 172 N.E.2d 571, 211 N.Y.S.2d
198 (1961).
86. However, there has been a widespread tendency in state courts
to consider the limitations on impairment of contracts as absolute rather
than subject to reasonable impairment. See Comment, Contractual Aspects of Pension Plan Modification, 56 COL. L. REV. 251 (1956). In fact,
the dominant motive behind Illinois use of the "gratuity" concept appears
to be avoidance of the consequences which would attach by calling
pension rights "contractual" and thus subject to the impairment of
contracts clause.
A reasonable power of impairment of contract by the state is usually
expressed in terms of the police power concept. The police power concept recognizes the ability of the legislature to consider the public health,
safety or morals, thus protecting these factors by interfering with or even
abolishing certain contract rights. See BRADEN AND COHN, THE ILLINOIS
CONSTITUTION:

AN ANNOTATED AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

70-76 (1969).

The concept has been applied in Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (temporary relief from mortgage obligations);
Hoyne v. Chicago & O.P. Elev. R.R., 294 Ill. 413, 128 N.E. 587 (1920) (rate
regulation); Wabash Eastern Ry. v. Comm'rs of East Lake Fork Special
Drainage Dist., 134 Ill. 384, 25 N.E. 781 (1890) (liens affecting existing
contract rights).
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the mandatory-optional distinction predating the 1970 constitution.8 7 Thus it appears that the "enforceable contractual relationship" mandated by the pension provision would not be easily
circumvented by this method. Furthermore, the word "enforceable" implies that the pension member whose rights were
diminished would have a remedy. It would be ironic to establish
a remedy and yet deny it expression by resort to an analogy
to reasonable impairment of contract.
An interpretation of the scope of the pension section depends
upon inferences drawn from the rather narrow holding in Peters.
It is unclear whether Illinois will rely on out of state precedent
for interpretation of its own pension section. But to the extent
that Illinois relies on New York precedent, it will have a major
effect on the extent of protection afforded to Illinois pension
rights. Analysis of the Peters case primarily concerned the
extent of protection which the public employee possessed for his
pension rights. The next case directly construing the pension
section deals with the more practical question of the extent of
funding which the constitutional provision might require.
THE FULL-FUNDING'ISSUE-PEOPLE ex

rel.

I.F.T. v. LINDBERG
The five state supported public employee pension funds in
Illinois depend on joint contributions by the state and state
employees.88 These funds have been continually under funded
by actuarial standards, which has been a matter of constant concern both to members of these funds and to the Pension Laws
Commission. 89 By 1975, the amount of accrued liabilities exceeded pension fund assets by over 5.7 billion dollars. This substantial figure, termed the "unfunded accrued liabilities," has
risen sharply and steadily in the last decade. 90 Although
unfunded accrued liabilities is an estimate, it nevertheless represents the actual amount of money needed in the future to pay
off presently existing pension obligations according to actuarial
87. Bardens v. Board of Trustees, 22 Ill. 2d 56, 174 N.E.2d 168 (1961)
(attempted impairment of judge's annuity rights). This case underscores the fact that although a reasonable impairment of contracts has
been allowed in some instances in Illinois, the courts have never applied
the concept to impair pension benefits. The possibility of using the concept does not imply that the guarantee of the pension section would be
easily circumvented.
88. See notes 5 and 8 supra.
89. 1973 PENsIoN REPORT 65-73.
90. Illinois Pension Fund Trends:
Unfunded Accrued

1967
1971
1975

Net Assets

Accrued Liabilities

Liabilities

$1,646,110,392
2,568,195,465
4,250,926,279

$3,594,718,075
5,742,849,950
9,999,528,004

$1,948,607.683
3,174,654,485
5,748,601,725

Source: 1975

REPORT OF ExAMINATION.
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projections.9 1 The Illinois General Assembly has generally
adopted a "pay as you go" philosophy, which pays little more
92
than the current year's obligations.
Although this issue is, at its root, a fiscal issue which might
be construed as political, there is some indication that provisions
of the pension statutes require a specific level of appropriations
by the General Assembly. 93 Also, portions of the convention
debate gave the Lindberg plaintiffs hope that the court would
construe the pension section as mandating full-funding by the
General Assembly.9 4 An additional complication in Lindberg
is that although the General Assembly had, in this case, appropriated funds which the plaintiffs felt were adequate, the Governor utilized an amendatory veto to reduce these amounts.
The court dismissed the contention that any specific level
of funding was mandated by the constitution. This result was
foreseeable in light of the lack of consensus on funding expressed
during the constitution debates.9 5 It was bolstered also by the
omission of any specific wording in the pension provision suggesting that any level of funding was required. 96 The court also
found that the Governor's veto powers took precedence over the
97
right of the pension funds to any level of appropriations.
A more thorough examination of Lindberg reveals that
perhaps the real factor controlling the determination was that
the case was premature. The court noted that, "[n] o allegation
was advanced. . that those presently entitled to receive pension
benefits were not receiving the necessary monies.""8 In concluding, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that "[p] laintiffs have
asserted that the respective pension funds are inadequately
funded. The question of the specific fiscal appropriations necessary to meet these deficiencies is one which, at this time,
91. 1973 Pension Report 68-69.
92. Id.
93. The State Universities Retirement System statute provides:
The contributions of employers from State appropriations for
any fiscal year shall not be less than an amount which is required
to fund fully the current service costs in accordance with actuarial
reserve requirements as prescribed in paragraph (1) of this Section,
plus interest at the prescribed rate on the unfunded accrued liabilities.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 1081/2, § 15-155 (1973).
94. Specifically, the plaintiffs relied on comments made by one pension section sponsor, delegate Green. See Verbatim Transcripts, vol. IV
at 2925, 2931.
95. See notes 46-48 supra, and accompanying text.
96. For comparison, see the Michigan constitutional provision which
explicitly prescribes funding measures, note 69 supra.
97. 60 Ill. 2d 266, 326 N.E.2d 749 (1975). The court felt that since
the constitution gives the governor broad budgetary powers, a construction of the constitution as a whole would result in his ability to use the
amendatory veto on pension appropriations.
98. Id. at 270, 326 N.E.2d at 751.
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should be directed to the legislature."9 9 It thus appears that
the pension rights in question had not been "impaired" to the
extent that the court felt constrained to intervene. In the event
of disruption of actual benefit payments caused by fiscal instability, the court would have to reevaluate the issue. 10 0
One disturbing point in Lindberg is the utilization of the
mandatory-optional participation distinction to refute plaintiff's
claim that the statutes described a contractual relationship which
the legislature was bound to honor by appropriating proper
monies. The court held that the statute had been previously construed as not defining a "contractual" relationship since, "it has
long been settled that compulsory participation in a statutory
pension plan confers no vested rights, thus permitting amendment, change, or repeal as the legislature sees fit."' 0 1 The
court had already decided that the constitution did not impose
a duty to fund pension plans at any level. Now it felt compelled
to block this additional challenge by use of pre-1970 case law.
This language seems to place doubt on the assumption that the
pension provision erased the mandatory-optional distinction.
The only justification for resort to this language is that it is
limited to the issue of full-funding. It is not conceivable that
the court could justify termination or modification of pension
benefits by resort to this language in the face of the new
pension provision's explicit wording. The court would have provided a great service if it had modified the use of the language
by an explanation of its limited scope of application in light of
the new constitution.
In both Peters and Lindberg the Illinois Supreme Court has
decided only the narrow issue at hand. No attempt has been
made to illuminate the crucial differences between the old status
of pensions and the new constitutionally protected status. If
only to serve as notice to all the affected parties, the court would
provide a great service by redefining the pension relationships
as they now exist in order to provide guidance for future conduct.
The Illinois General Assembly could legislate more wisely if it
knew with certainty what status the enacted pension benefits
carried. And certainly the individual pension plan members
99. Id. at 277, 326 N.E.2d at 755 (emphasis added).
100. This conclusion is suggested by a comment of delegate Kinney
at the constitutional convention which the Lindberg court cites:
It was not intended to require 100 per cent funding or 50 per cent
funding or 30 per cent funding or get into any of those problems,
aside from the very slim area where a court might judicially determine that imminent bankruptcy might really be impairment.
Id. -at 271, 326 N.E.2d at 752.
101. Id. at 273, 326 N.E.2d at 752 (citing Bergin v. Board of Trustees of
Teacher's Retirement System, 31 Ill. 2d 566, 202 N.E.2d 489 (1964)).
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deserve some confirmation of the intended effect of the pension
provision.
CONCLUSION-EFFECTIVE SECURITY FOR PENSION RIGHTS

One must exercise caution in speculating on future interpretations of article XIII, section 5 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution. The guarantee of an "enforceable contractual relationship"
must not be thought of as an all-encompassing status possessed
by the public employee. The Illinois Supreme Court has been
extremely careful to limit both Peters and Lindberg to their
narrow issues, presumably in order to retain a flexibility to cope
with unforeseen difficulties in the future. In so doing, the court
has twice limited the meaning of the pension section. Also,
analysis of persuasive precedent from other jurisdictions suggests
limitations on the apparent meaning of the section's word2
ing.10
Further caution in speculating on the meaning of the pension
section is merited because of the strength of the mandatoryoptional distinction. Illinois has adhered religiously to this distinction since its inception in the 19th century. Arguments and
reasoning based on the mandatory-optional distinction have even
crept up several times since the effective date of the 1970 Constitution without any mention of the pension section's supposed
effect.1 0 3 The resurrection of mandatory-optional reasoning in
Lindberg is a prime example of the tenacity of this old concept.
Although it is scarcely conceivable, it would be ironic if pension
rights were held to be contractual under the 1970 Constitution,
yet subject to derogation based on pre-1970 case law distinctions.
The authorities examined suggest the opposite conclusion,
that the effect of the 1970 Illinois Constitution's pension section
is to place all public employee pensions under the scope of protection given by the contractual theory. Pre-1970 cases which protected pension rights under the contractual theory stressed very
clearly that its effect was to reverse the traditional rule that
pensions were "bounties" or "gratuities," for which no contractual relationship existed. Under the contractual theory, pension
benefits were protected from the date of initial employment.
The package of pension laws applicable to a specific pensioner
upon entry into government service was one which could not
be changed in a way that would impair his rights. The pension
section in the 1970 Illinois Constitution states not only that a
102. See notes 65-76 supra, and accompanying text.

103. People ex rel. I.F.T. v. Lindberg, 60 Ill. 2d 266, 326 N.E.2d 749

(1975); Lee v. Retirement Board of Policemen's Annuity and Benefit
Fund, 22 Ill. App. 3d 600, 317 N.E.2d 758 (1974); Londrigan v. Board of

Trustees, 7 Ill. App. 3d 572, 288 N.E.2d 125 (1972).
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"contractual relationship" exists; it emphasizes the point by addition of the word "enforceable" before the phrase "contractual
relationship." Surely the pension section brings pension rights
under the protection of the contractual theory. Anything less
than that degree of protection already afforded by the courts
before the 1970 Constitution would be inconceivable.
The State of Illinois must establish and maintain a vital
awareness that the new constitution's pension section has drastically changed the longstanding "gratuity" label applied to most
pensions. rt is no longer enough that the State has always
fulfilled its good faith promise to provide pension benefits when
due. The obligation is now constitutionally mandated in explicit
terms. Legislators and the tax-paying public must be aware that
present and future pension plan legislation imposes obligations
which are binding now and must be redeemed in the future.
It may well be argued that the new pension provision is
unwise if it prohibits any legislative modification of pension
benefits to meet future contingencies. It seems clear from the
authorities that this is precisely the effect of the pension section.
While a reasonable degree of modification would have been a
practical and more desirable method of pension protection,
there is no suggestion in either the wording of the pension section or the debates on it which supports this method. In retrospect it appears that neither the framers of the pension section
nor the public which ratified the 1970 Illinois Constitution were
aware of the severe strictures which were thereby imposed on
the Illinois General Assembly's power to modify pension plans.
Effective security for pension benefits rests on the protection
provided by the constitution, but in even more practical terms
it depends on pension funding. Although pension funding may
be construed as more a political than a legal issue, it is nevertheless a vital element of pension rights. While Lindberg may
have held that no specific level of funding is mandated by the
constitution, at some point a lack of funding would truly impair
an individual's right to a pension payment. In such a case the
courts would be forced to fashion a remedy which would live
up to the constitutional promise of an "enforceable contractual
relationship." While no Illinois pension fund has presently
defaulted on its obligations, several factors point to a difficult
future. Actuarial estimates of increased pension costs, increases
in the numbers of public employees and the amount of their
compensation, and possible worsening of economic conditions are
factors indicating that pension fund stability will be severely
tested in the remainder of this century.
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While the law should not concern itself too deeply with
political and financial considerations, it cannot remain in a
vacuum. It must relate itself to real and not theoretical problems. There is a certain futility to fixing rules and concepts of
law only to find that actual circumstances have rendered them
useless. Thus, in strictly practical terms, pension security does
depend on the good faith and fiscal responsibility of those
responsible for the funding and protection of pension funds.
Until the 1970 Illinois Constitution, members of mandatory
participation plans could only rely on the good faith of the legislature and the fiscal stability of their plans. The new pension
section does not leave pension protection to these factors, it
mandates a constitutionally protected status for pension benefits
of all public employee pension plans. The term "enforceable contractual relationship" is not a mere label which may be minimized by the courts, and its effect must not be overlooked by
legislators enacting new pension benefits. Public employee pension benefits in Illinois now carry the full weight of the 1970
Illinois Constitution. They are "enforceable contractual relationships," and the benefits may not be diminished or impaired.
Loren Oury

